Yes, but Will has copped to his errors of judgment, which is by far the most important thing. Freddie should focus more on those like Charles Krauthammer who was the intellectual architect of the worst foreign policy disaster since Vietnam and is still treated as a foreign policy and military expert in Washington.
That might move me more were it not for the fact that Saletan expresses his defense of drones with precisely the same condescending certitude he displayed when he insisted that those who wanted to minimize civilian casualties in Iraq had to shut up and support the war. And that points to the bigger problem: it's not just that he got it so wrong; it's that he seemingly took nothing from getting it so wrong, and that there are no professional consequences for him not evolving in response to getting it wrong. I pulled out that argument because it is nearly identical, in every respect, to the one he is making today about drones. The thinking is totally the same. Saying you're sorry for getting it wrong is important. But changing your thinking in reaction to getting it wrong is even more important. And not only has Saletan betrayed no evolution in his thinking, he's demonstrating literally the identical train of thought here that he did in 2003: stop complaining because our military is so skillful and so moral that innocent people aren't going to get hurt. Men like Saletan never, never stop believing in the inexhaustible goodness and proficiency of the American war machine, or in the lie of war without war. Not even after hundreds of thousands of Iraqis dead.
Were it just Saletan, it would be a small problem. But it is a problem that exists for our entire newsmedia: what systems of accountability are there at all? What forms of assessment? It's one of the most important jobs in the world, and yet no one can provide me with anything resembling a cogent answer. Indeed, when I asked, I am told that asking is an example of my bad behavior. Saletan, ludicrously, accused me of ad hominem, for a post in which I merely quote the entirety of a post, without elision. (A post, I might add, in which he asserts the complicity of antiwar activists in the killing of innocents.)
Today, the preference for those who get it wrong continues. When Glenn Greenwald or Jeremy Scahill speak out against American military operations, the burden of proof they face is still far higher than for those who advocate the use of military force. And, indeed, people like them are still considered on the fringes of polite political conversation. Why? Look at the people who publicly opposed the Iraq war before it started, back when it mattered. To a truly dispiriting degree, they tend to remain in less prominent and respected positions than those who supported the war. (Here's a depressing game: which New York Times columnists opposed the war before it began?) And those who have admitted wrongdoing tend to say that "those who got it right did so for the wrong reasons"-- a stance that ensures that the least useful lesson will be learned. What do you think the message of all this is, for people within our media? What does that incentive structure lead to?
Let's take two other examples that are dear to Sully's heart: Christopher Hitchens and Jeffrey Goldberg. Hitchens not only explicitly refused to say he had been wrong about Iraq, he continued to wage a maximally-aggressive argument against those who had opposed the war. There were no professional consequences for Hitchens; his stature only grew. And the Dish continues to give him a forum. (Posthumously!) Goldberg did not merely get Iraq wrong. He was directly complicit in credulous journalism that helped build the case for going to war in the first place. There were no professional consequences. On the contrary, he got a more prominent position and, apparently, a raise. He has since undergone a campaign to attack his critics and continue to make the thoroughly discredited case that Saddam was connected to Al Qaeda. Once ensconced at The Atlantic, he took to the cover to predict that an Israeli strike on Iran was imminent, staking the magazine's significant prestige in doing so. That was two and a half years ago. There have been no professional consequences of any kind.
If you're a writer at The Atlantic, what possible professional incentive do you feel to get it right? What fear do you have of getting it wrong? When people who get such specific questions so deeply wrong suffer no professional consequences whatsoever, how will the magazine ever get better? If you're Conor Friedersdorf or Garance Franke-Ruta or Derek Thompson or any other staffer there, what process internal to the magazine pushes you to get things right? It's bizarre that our chief neoliberal magazine seems to not believe in professional incentives. Please, somebody with access, ask James Bennet: does your magazine have standards?
I'm 31 years old. My country has considered itself to be at war-- and invoked all of the frightening powers that comes along with it-- for a third of my life. No one is naive enough to think that this will end soon. As a mere citizen, one who fights to stay informed, I am totally at the mercy of our media. And not only has that media not developed anything like a system of internal accountability or review, it rewards those who get it wrong and punishes those who ask for reform. What does Andrew want me to do?
Were it just Saletan, it would be a small problem. But it is a problem that exists for our entire newsmedia: what systems of accountability are there at all? What forms of assessment? It's one of the most important jobs in the world, and yet no one can provide me with anything resembling a cogent answer. Indeed, when I asked, I am told that asking is an example of my bad behavior. Saletan, ludicrously, accused me of ad hominem, for a post in which I merely quote the entirety of a post, without elision. (A post, I might add, in which he asserts the complicity of antiwar activists in the killing of innocents.)
Today, the preference for those who get it wrong continues. When Glenn Greenwald or Jeremy Scahill speak out against American military operations, the burden of proof they face is still far higher than for those who advocate the use of military force. And, indeed, people like them are still considered on the fringes of polite political conversation. Why? Look at the people who publicly opposed the Iraq war before it started, back when it mattered. To a truly dispiriting degree, they tend to remain in less prominent and respected positions than those who supported the war. (Here's a depressing game: which New York Times columnists opposed the war before it began?) And those who have admitted wrongdoing tend to say that "those who got it right did so for the wrong reasons"-- a stance that ensures that the least useful lesson will be learned. What do you think the message of all this is, for people within our media? What does that incentive structure lead to?
Let's take two other examples that are dear to Sully's heart: Christopher Hitchens and Jeffrey Goldberg. Hitchens not only explicitly refused to say he had been wrong about Iraq, he continued to wage a maximally-aggressive argument against those who had opposed the war. There were no professional consequences for Hitchens; his stature only grew. And the Dish continues to give him a forum. (Posthumously!) Goldberg did not merely get Iraq wrong. He was directly complicit in credulous journalism that helped build the case for going to war in the first place. There were no professional consequences. On the contrary, he got a more prominent position and, apparently, a raise. He has since undergone a campaign to attack his critics and continue to make the thoroughly discredited case that Saddam was connected to Al Qaeda. Once ensconced at The Atlantic, he took to the cover to predict that an Israeli strike on Iran was imminent, staking the magazine's significant prestige in doing so. That was two and a half years ago. There have been no professional consequences of any kind.
If you're a writer at The Atlantic, what possible professional incentive do you feel to get it right? What fear do you have of getting it wrong? When people who get such specific questions so deeply wrong suffer no professional consequences whatsoever, how will the magazine ever get better? If you're Conor Friedersdorf or Garance Franke-Ruta or Derek Thompson or any other staffer there, what process internal to the magazine pushes you to get things right? It's bizarre that our chief neoliberal magazine seems to not believe in professional incentives. Please, somebody with access, ask James Bennet: does your magazine have standards?
I'm 31 years old. My country has considered itself to be at war-- and invoked all of the frightening powers that comes along with it-- for a third of my life. No one is naive enough to think that this will end soon. As a mere citizen, one who fights to stay informed, I am totally at the mercy of our media. And not only has that media not developed anything like a system of internal accountability or review, it rewards those who get it wrong and punishes those who ask for reform. What does Andrew want me to do?
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